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Merges upstream tag v1.2.19 (9e39a50) into merge/upstream-1.2.18 (991853f).
Unlike the 1.2.15->1.2.18 replay, bc3de30 is a true ancestor of our branch via
a9b4f89, so this is an ordinary three-way merge with merge-base bc3de30.
Delta: 36 files, +3265/-163, the Tor onion transport (managed Tor, signed
direct onion endpoints, onion-only dial mode) and the nHDNext restore fix.
src/main.cpp, main.h, script.cpp/h and db.cpp/h are byte-identical between the
two tags, and the poll() socket loop carries no diff hunks, so the merge is
consensus-neutral and the soak-tested socket paths are unchanged. relay/ is
untouched; the payout ledger (rpc.cpp) is untouched.
7 conflict blocks in 6 files, resolved as follows.
Makefile -- VERSION. Ours: stays 1.2.19+sec with the naming comment updated,
so artifacts from this tree cannot be mistaken for the upstream release.
src/Makefile, src/makefile.mingw -- HEADERS list. Ours (no market.h) plus
their tor.h. NODE_OBJS auto-merged correctly: no market.o, tor.o present.
src/selftest.cpp -- known-tests list. Union: payout-ledger (ours) and
managed-tor (theirs).
src/main_gui.cpp -- one block. Our /dumpaddresses kept; their
BtfStopManagedTor() on the StartNode failure path taken. The /rvrelay pin,
/noannounce and the marketplace removal auto-merged and were verified intact.
src/nostr.cpp -- two blocks in ResolveDescriptor. Signature takes both
out-params (our fExchangeOk, their rawOut). The body keeps our
drain-to-EOSE read -- returning early poisons the pooled socket for the next
caller -- and adds their rawOut capture. Our TLS 1.2 floor
(SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version) is untouched by this merge; upstream 1.2.19
still has no floor of its own.
Upstream's release commit also added four build logs and a compiled Python
cache (build-1219.log, build-17.log, build-appimage.log, build-node.log,
scripts/__pycache__/bitflash_chain.cpython-313.pyc). Removed here; they are
build output, not source.
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A new `payout-ledger` self-test, 40 assertions, wired into RunSelfTest and
into `make -C src tests`. It runs against a scratch data directory and an
in-memory wallet map: it never opens wallet.dat, never touches a real datadir,
and never sends anything.
What it asserts, defect by defect:
- a restart does not duplicate an in-flight record. A matured round is
exploded, the process state is thrown away and reloaded from the files
twice, and the in-flight list must still hold exactly one record per
recipient. Both guards are checked separately -- once with the round-level
set restored, and once with it deliberately emptied so only the
per-recipient check against gPaying can save it. A paying file already
containing the duplicate the old build wrote must collapse on load, with
the attempt counts merged upwards rather than reset.
- state updates address a slot, not a value. Two records equal in every
field -- exactly what the old code produced -- and rescheduling or
forgetting one must land on the one it was given.
- the ledger file cannot be published from a stale snapshot. An older
snapshot published after a newer one must not appear on disk, and four
threads publishing 64 large images of the same file in different orders
must leave it parseable and equal to the highest version, whatever order
they finish in.
- a payment with only a legacy comment is recognised as already paid, and
the fallback's limits hold: it requires the right recipient, the exact
amount and the right height; one legacy transaction cannot settle a second
debt; a transaction carrying another round's structured metadata is never
accepted as legacy evidence; and the structured match still wins where it
applies.
- grandfathered zero-hash rounds do not answer for each other, both as a
direct test of the round comparison and end to end -- recording a txid
against one zero-hash round must leave the other still owed.
- the retry clock that is actually used survives a restart.
- a forfeit is published rather than silently dropped: the ledger loses that
recipient and only that recipient, and the round proof records it with a
reason instead of going on advertising the address as owed.
- on-disk compatibility, checked against the real shapes: the live
production pending_payouts.json (amounts / blockHash / blockHeight /
matureAtHeight and nothing else), the merged build's shape including the
retryAfter this build no longer writes, and a round trip through this
build.
Each assertion was verified to fail when its defect is put back: seven
mutations were applied one at a time to a scratch copy and every one was
caught. Notably, re-introducing either half of the duplicate-record fix alone
is caught by its own assertion while the other half still prevents the
duplicate -- which is the defence in depth this series was asked for, checked
rather than asserted.
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Merges upstream tag v1.2.18 (bc3de30) into our 24 commits. The merge base is
a259215, upstream's own commit, whose src/ tree is byte-identical to 68de575 --
our commits were replayed onto a259215 first so that git had a real base to work
from. That produced 28 conflict hunks in 9 files instead of the 21 conflict
events / 51 hunks a direct cherry-pick onto the tag would have forced, most of
which were artifacts of lifting our commits away from their own predecessors.
No consensus change. main.cpp's GetBlockValue, GetNextWorkRequired,
ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, CheckBlock, AcceptBlock and AcceptTransaction are
untouched by this merge; script.cpp, serialize.h and randomx_pow.h are
identical on both sides. The frozen-chain oracle reproduces the pinned UTXO root
116a2b6b... byte for byte, and the merged binary loads the same 12,586-block
chain to the same tip aac622f0a3b2f8... with all blocks re-verified and none
rejected.
Which side won, per file and per hunk.
src/rpc.cpp -- 15 hunks.
1. RebuildJob transaction selection. THEIRS for the multi-pass loop and the
nFees fix, OURS for the cap. Their vfAlreadyAdded/fFoundSomething loop lands
dependent transactions that our single pass dropped deterministically, and
their nFees is accumulated across the scan instead of being redeclared inside
it -- ours passed a hardcoded 0 to GetBlockValue, so every pool block built
here discarded its fees. But their bound is MAX_SIZE/2 = 16 MB, and
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE is 1 MB, so their template can exceed what their own
CheckBlock accepts. Cap kept at MAX_BLOCK_SIZE/2, with our inner break so a
single pass cannot overshoot by more than one transaction. Our RebuildJob
sync gating and deaf-node detection are kept; upstream has none.
2. struct PendingPayout. OURS for the key, THEIRS for paidTxids. Their id is
the string "block-<height>", which is height keying -- the exact bug 44849e6
fixed after a 280-block reorg left ~14.4k BTF owed against blocks that no
longer existed. Height keying also lets the crash-recovery probe match the
previous round's transaction after a reorg and silently skip a miner, so
their id is dropped entirely and blockHash stays the key. paidTxids is taken
because it is what makes an entry survivable. Their nextAttempt and our
retryAfter are the same concept under two names; ours is kept and theirs
dropped. matureAtHeight gained an explicit = 0, which neither side had in
our style of initialiser.
3./4. Ledger writer and loader. Mechanical follow-ons of 2. The loader keeps
ours and takes their tolerance for an entry with no usable height, guarded so
it cannot fire on a well-formed entry. One redundancy was removed rather than
merged: their unguarded `if (obj.contains("blockHeight")) get<int>()` sat two
lines above our is_number-guarded version, and an unguarded get<int>() on a
malformed value throws out of the whole loop, losing every entry in the file.
Verified against the live production pending_payouts.json (2 entries, keys
amounts/blockHash/blockHeight/matureAtHeight): loads both. A file in the new
shape, with retryAfter and paidTxids, also loads.
5. Insertion point after the loader. BOTH. Our PayingRecord/gPaying in-flight
ledger and their PoolRoundProof/PoolRoundToJson are disjoint features that
landed at the same offset. Both kept, in full.
6. Writer tail. THEIRS, copied into our writer. Checking fclose() matters here
because fclose is where the buffered write actually reaches the OS: renaming
a short .tmp over a good file is precisely the truncation the atomic write
exists to prevent. The Windows remove()-before-rename() is required because
rename() there will not replace an existing file.
7. Loader bodies. BOTH -- LoadPaying and LoadPoolRounds are different functions
that happened to share a common tail.
8. Function block, 111 vs 36 lines. BOTH, with one deliberate deletion.
PayoutBlockStillOnChain, PayoutComment, RecordPoolRound, MarkPoolRoundPaid
all kept. WalletAlreadyPaid is DELETED and ReconcilePayouts rewritten,
because our reconciliation and their FindRecordedPoolPayout are two answers
to the same crash-recovery question and running both would give the same debt
two authorities. Their wallet probe wins: it matches structured metadata
rather than a comment string, so it can tell two rounds paying the same
address the same amount apart. ReconcilePayouts keeps only the job that is
still real -- dropping in-flight records the ledger already shows paid, and
arming each restored record for its one wallet probe. It no longer touches
gPendingPayouts at all; under the new model dropping ledger entries there
would reintroduce the loss this merge adopts their model to prevent. Their
gPayoutExecMutex/gPayoutThreadRunning re-declarations were dropped as
duplicates of ours, and gPayoutExecQueue was not taken: gPaying is the exec
queue in this tree, at finer granularity.
9. QueuePayouts signature. THEIRS for the round-proof arguments, OURS for the
type of blockHash. It stays a uint256 and is converted to hex only where the
round proof needs text -- a ledger key that has been through ToString() is a
key that can be compared wrong.
10. Maturity policy. OURS. matureAtHeight = blockHeight +
COINBASE_SPENDABLE_DEPTH (120), not + COINBASE_MATURITY (100). At depth 100
the block's own coinbase is still 20 blocks short of spendable, so the
payment must come from unrelated mature coin and the pool runs a permanent
float. Our own history contradicts itself here -- d6972a0 argued for
COINBASE_MATURITY citing "96% of 934 payments", 44849e6 reversed it on the
grounds that the measurement was taken while the node was alone on a private
fork paying itself. HEAD's position is kept. This is a considered
disagreement with upstream, not an oversight. The live production ledger
confirms it: both entries have matureAtHeight - blockHeight = 120.
11. Comment above FlushMaturePayouts. Rewritten to describe the merged design.
12. FlushMaturePayouts, the central difference. THEIRS for the model. The ledger
entry now survives on disk until every recipient has a txid, instead of
being erased as soon as its payments were handed off -- the old ordering
left a window where the debt was described by nothing at all, and a
container restart on 2026-07-30 silently dropped ~1,156 BTF through it. Our
gPaying is kept on top as the in-flight working set, because it carries the
per-recipient retry and deferral state a per-round nextAttempt cannot
express. It is explicitly a cache derived from the ledger, not a second
record of debt: if it were lost the next flush would rebuild it.
13. PayoutThreadFn, 79 vs 70 lines. OURS for the loop and the reorg re-check,
THEIRS for the per-recipient dedupe. The re-check on every attempt is
load-bearing and upstream has no equivalent -- it decides once, at maturity,
and a payment can sit through hours of retries during which the reorg that
kills its funding block can land. Their paidTxids check is taken, against
the ledger rather than against the batch. Our deferral policy is kept:
waiting for coin is not a failure and must not consume the retry budget.
Two fixes upstream does not have are folded in here rather than deferred to
a follow-up commit:
- FindRecordedPoolPayout runs once per record, on its first attempt, not on
every attempt. It is a linear scan of mapWallet under cs_mapWallet, per
recipient; upstream repeats it for every retry, which with 2000 rotating
payout addresses and a budget of 1440 retries is a full wallet scan per
address per minute for a day. The question it answers can only change
across a restart, and every restart re-arms the flag.
- The ledger file write no longer happens under gPayoutLedgerMutex in the
per-recipient loop. SavePendingPayoutsLocked was split into a serialise
step that needs the lock and a write step that does not, so the mutex is
held only long enough to read the structure. The orphan scan in
FlushMaturePayouts was likewise restructured so the ledger mutex is not
held across PayoutBlockStillOnChain's cs_main acquisition.
One case the merged model created and neither side handled: under
survives-until-fully-paid, our GIVING UP path dropped the in-flight record
but left the recipient owed in the ledger forever, so every later flush
would explode it again -- a forfeit that silently becomes an infinite retry.
ForfeitPayoutRecipient writes the amount off so the entry can retire.
14. QueuePayouts call site. Follow-on of 9.
15. ThreadRPCServer startup. BOTH. LoadPoolRounds added; LoadPaying and
ReconcilePayouts stay, and stay before the payout thread starts.
Crash safety, stated as the property that must hold: after kill -9 at any
point, restart pays each recipient exactly once. Before SendMoney, the
ledger has no txid and the payment is retried. Between SendMoney and the
ledger write, the wallet holds the transaction and the first-attempt probe
finds it. After the ledger write, paidTxids suppresses it. If the in-flight
file is lost entirely, the ledger rebuilds it and the probe still covers the
middle window.
src/nostr.cpp -- 3 hunks. THEIRS as the base, with two things restored from
ours. Theirs loads the Windows ROOT certificate store, which ours lacks and
genuinely needs, since OpenSSL's default verify paths are usually empty there
and our version would fail closed. But the plan's claim that theirs is a
superset of our 06bceb4 is FALSE: upstream's nostr.cpp contains no
min_proto_version, no TLS1_2, no SSL_OP_NO_*, and no set_options anywhere, so
taking it wholesale would have removed the TLS-version floor outright. Restored.
Second, their SSL_get_verify_result check sits after a successful handshake,
where with SSL_VERIFY_PEER set it is nearly dead code -- a bad certificate
aborts inside SSL_connect. The reporting belongs in the failure branch, which is
where the merge put it; their post-handshake duplicate was dropped. Our
relay-list and socket-pooling hunks auto-merged and were verified intact.
src/net.cpp -- 1 hunk. THEIRS. Their guard, hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET ||
pnode->hSocket != hSocket, subsumes ours and additionally catches descriptor
recycling, which ours did not; our version also referenced a pnode that only
existed in the select() loop. Our other db34011 hunk, nulling pnode->hSocket in
the poll-failure branch, auto-merged and was NOT re-applied -- plan section 7
Batch D says to re-apply it, and that instruction is stale. Two pieces of
residue the merge left behind were cleaned up: a comment still describing
select() semantics, and a pnode->hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET guard made redundant
by a continue two lines above it.
src/main.cpp -- 2 hunks. h1 BOTH, pure add/add adjacency between our
ParticipantHashThreadCount and their SecureClear forward declarations. h2 OURS,
and their handler discarded: 44004e3 no-ops checkorder/submitorder but keeps
market.cpp and market.h, whereas 11766be deletes the marketplace outright
including CRequestTracker, subscribe/publish and mapProducts. Ours is strictly
more.
src/main_gui.cpp -- 2 hunks. BOTH, additive on both sides. Our /payoutaddr,
/payoutfile and /hashthreads alongside their /stratumbridge and
/stratumbridgeport.
src/btfrv.cpp -- 1 hunk, not predicted by the plan. False adjacency: our
INVALID_SOCKET check and their #endif landed at the same offset. Ordering is
load-bearing -- our check goes inside the #else arm, before the #endif, or the
non-proxy build silently loses it. The BITFLASH_NODE_BUILD arm already returns
early, so both paths now have the check.
Makefile -- 2 hunks plus a hazard with no conflict marker. THEIRS for both
dependency-fetch recipes: checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD followed by test
"$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$(..._COMMIT)" asserts the pin actually landed, where
ours only checked it out. Everything of ours that they lack is kept: the
appimagetool 1.9.1 release pin with a sha256 check, where upstream fetches the
mutable "continuous" tag and executes it undigested, and the move of both the
tool and the AppDir out of /tmp, where any local user could pre-place an
executable and have it run as whoever runs make.
The hazard: both sides added a pin block in a different place, so git merged
both, outside any conflict region. SECP256K1_COMMIT and RANDOMX_COMMIT ended up
assigned twice, near L16 and near L44, and GNU Make takes the last := -- a naive
resolution would have silently built against our old secp256k1 pin while
appearing to adopt upstream's. The duplicate block was deleted by hand. Each of
the four variables is now assigned exactly once, and make -n resolves
SECP256K1_COMMIT to 7fecac74 with 6e2c8bc4 appearing nowhere.
Also applied here, from plan phase 4: SECP256K1_COMMIT moved to upstream's
7fecac74aed8e1fd9078380d67dd04663705c989 so signature validation matches the
binaries the rest of the network runs. secp256k1 was rebuilt from scratch
against the new pin on the build host and the checked-out dependency commit
verified. RANDOMX_COMMIT already matched at 1e9d4b2d and is unchanged.
src/Makefile, src/makefile.mingw -- 1 hunk each, both the HEADERS list. Ours
drops market.h, theirs adds proxy.h; the resolution does both. Taking theirs
wholesale would have left the Makefiles referencing a header git had already
deleted in our favour, silently, without a conflict.
Files the plan predicted would conflict and did not: net.h, main.h and db.cpp
auto-merged. Verified rather than assumed. net.h carries both our
BTF_MSG_WAIT_MAX_SECS work, including the constructor fix from 2d84982 that
starts nMsgWaitSince and nMsgWaitSize at 0, and their comment rewrite with
extern int nPeersWatched. The dead members that fix removed are gone from every
file.
Deviations from MERGE-1.2.18-PLAN.md.
- Section 6's mechanism was not used. Replayed onto the real merge base and
merged, rather than cherry-picking onto the tag. Same result, 28 hunks
instead of 51.
- Section 2 calls 09ff575 a superset of our 06bceb4. It is not; upstream has no
TLS-version floor at all. Ours restored on top of theirs.
- Section 7 Batch D says to re-apply our db34011 line into their poll-failure
branch. It auto-merged; re-applying would have duplicated it.
- Section 2 says do not take the stratum bridge. It is taken, and left off.
fStratumBridge defaults false in main.cpp, the thread is only spawned when
/stratumbridge is passed, and the listener binds 127.0.0.1 only. Excising it
would cost real divergence and future conflict for no gain while it is
disabled. Its defects -- select()/FD_SET on a node that can hold more than
1024 descriptors, and an uncapped thread per connection -- are real only when
it is enabled and are being reported upstream separately.
- Section 7's staged batches were not run as separate gated commits. The
conflict surface is interleaved within single functions, chiefly the payout
ledger, and splitting it would have meant committing states that do not
build. The merge is one commit, as briefed.
- Batch F's two fixes are folded into hunk 13 rather than deferred, because
they change the same lines the resolution rewrites.
- The plan did not anticipate the btfrv.cpp conflict, the duplicate pin block,
the market.h trap in the two Makefiles, or the give-up/infinite-retry
interaction created by adopting upstream's ledger model.
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CNode's constructor never wrote nMsgWaitSince or nMsgWaitSize, so every peer
began life with indeterminate values in the pair ProcessMessages uses to
decide whether that peer has stopped sending, and the first partial message
it read was measured against them.
The guard restarts the clock only when nMsgWaitSince is 0 or the buffer has
grown since the last look. Garbage in nMsgWaitSince is neither, so the very
first look fell through to the timeout branch. A peer that merely split a
message across two TCP segments -- header in one, body in the next, which is
ordinary on any real link -- could be dropped as unreadable on first contact,
before it had sent anything wrong and often before its version message. It
was never reproducible either: what happened depended on what had last used
that heap. The log reported the stall as roughly the age of the epoch:
peer 127.0.0.1:8433 announced a 100 byte 'block' and has sent nothing more
for 1786593923 s (0 of 100 payload bytes) -- dropping, this peer is
unreadable
Every node is running this.
Introduced in 7f6e5ad, which added the pair to the class and to
ProcessMessages but not to the constructor; the constructor went on
initialising nIncompleteMessageStart, nIncompleteMessageSize and
strIncompleteMessageCommand, the upstream members our implementation
supersedes. 5490d66 removed their last reader from ProcessMessages, and
nothing has read or written them since, so they go, with
BTF_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE_TIMEOUT_SECS -- decoy state in a networking struct is
how this happened, and the merge ahead of us would carry it further. The
initialiser list now follows declaration order, so a member missing from it
is visible.
The net-message selftest was asserting on those dead members too, which is
why it could not have caught this: it read state no code path writes, and its
stale-message case passed only when the garbage in nMsgWaitSince happened to
look old. Rewired onto nMsgWaitSince / nMsgWaitSize / BTF_MSG_WAIT_MAX_SECS,
and given the two cases it never covered -- a new peer's clock must start
stopped, and a peer that is still delivering payload must not be dropped
however old its clock is.
Measured on the build host, 20 runs each: before, net-message failed 20/20
("a fresh incomplete message does not disconnect immediately" failed 17/20 by
itself). After, 20/20 pass. Rewired selftest against a reverted constructor
fix: fails 20/20, deterministically, where the old suite caught it by luck or
not at all.
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The legacy parser only accepted two decimal places (cents) and rejected
0.5, leaving six of the eight coin decimals unreachable by -sendto and the
send window. Parse up to 8 fractional digits Bitcoin-style, reject >8 to
avoid silent truncation. Adds the parse-money selftest (12 cases).
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The coin type 4346950 (0x425446 = BTF) was merged into the SLIP-0044
registry on 2026-08-07. Rename HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH_PROVISIONAL to
HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH and update comments, logs and UI strings.
Value is unchanged, so derivation paths and addresses are identical.
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(#134)
* wallet: refuse future encrypted wallet formats
* wallet: add encrypted key unlock core
* wallet: add encryptwallet rewrite command
* wallet: read passphrases from stdin or files
* wallet: keep the derivation across encryption, and take the logs with it
Two things stopped the encryption stack from being safe to merge. Both
were found against a wallet holding real coin, not in the self-tests.
1. Encrypting turned a BIP44 wallet into a legacy one.
LoadWallet() ends by resetting the schema and the derivation counters
when no seed is in memory. That was written when "no seed after loading"
could only mean the wallet had none. An encrypted wallet has a seed --
it just has not been decrypted yet -- so the reset threw away metadata
that had been read correctly a moment earlier. Unlocking later restores
the seed and nothing restores the rest.
Measured on the wallet from the #124 proof: after encrypting, index 1
moved off BAtgSgra2X8Dqo5PJzPCLJhPwrrC2thYVJ, the address actually
holding 1.00 BTF, and the audit went from "1.00 covered by the phrase"
to "0.00 covered, 1.00 wallet.dat-only". Encrypt your wallet and the
program told you your recovery phrase no longer covered your money.
Now the condition also accepts a wallet whose seed is present but
encrypted. Same wallet, before and after: schema bip44, same four
derived addresses, 1.00 BTF still reported as covered.
2. The plaintext keys stayed behind in the Berkeley DB logs.
wallet.dat comes out clean -- verified by scanning the raw file for the
118 bytes of a known private key. database/log.0000000002 did not: it
held the whole key, and still did after a full node restart, because
every record this wallet ever wrote passed through the log.
That defeats the feature for the case it exists for, since our own
backup advice is to copy the whole directory rather than wallet.dat
alone. log_archive() cannot fix it: it only drops logs Berkeley DB
considers obsolete and never the one it is writing to, and with one 10
MB log per directory that is precisely where the keys are. They also did
not get there at encryption time -- they accumulated over the wallet's
whole life -- so nothing done during the rewrite can archive them out.
So the encrypt command now closes the environment and deletes the logs
on its way out, after the flush that makes every .dat self-contained.
This is not secure erasure; the blocks are unlinked, not overwritten.
It closes the case of someone reading a copied data directory.
Getting there uncovered a third bug, older than both.
DBFlush(true) is not safe to call twice. The first call closes the
environment, and txn_checkpoint() on a closed environment segfaults
instead of returning an error, so the try/catch around it never sees
anything. EncryptWallet() already flushes before renaming the wallet,
and the command flushes again on the way out -- that pair crashed every
single time. Guarded now.
The same function has been calling log_archive() with the address of an
uninitialised pointer since 0.1.0, on every clean shutdown, in a path
whose catch(...) cannot catch a structured fault on Windows.
DB_ARCH_REMOVE requires that argument to be NULL. Fixed while here,
because the encryption cleanup depends on that call not being a coin
flip.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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* Add BIP32 path derivation foundation
* Add HD wallet schema metadata
* Add provisional BIP44 coin type metadata
* Activate BIP44 wallet derivation
* wallet: scan BIP44 restore depth per branch
* wallet: widen default BIP44 restore lookahead
---------
Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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CheckBlock() validated block size against MAX_SIZE, the serializer's generic 32 MB guard rather than a block rule; MAX_BLOCK_SIZE did not exist in this tree at all, because Bitcoin's 1 MB cap arrived in 0.3.x, after the 0.1.0 this fork came from. A miner could produce a 32 MB block and every node would download, verify and store it.
Original work by mtg0001 in #110, rebased over #109 with the self-test conflict resolved, plus a comment explaining why the inherited count-against-bytes test stays.
Measured before choosing the number: 5709 blocks read from blk0001.dat give a largest block of 34,290 bytes and a median of 216, so 1 MB leaves 29x of headroom and rejects nothing that exists. A node built from this branch then synced genesis to 5706 on the live network with zero size-limit rejections and zero CheckBlock errors -- the same test that caught BIP30 rejecting a real block at height 859.
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Change from an HD wallet now goes to a newly derived phrase-backed key instead of reusing a spent input's key. Reusing an input key silently moved value back to a key the phrase cannot reproduce; if derivation fails the transaction is refused rather than creating unrecoverable change. Legacy wallets with no seed keep the 0.1.0 behaviour. Restore also scans past the pre-generated key-pool window before treating an empty batch as the end.
The message parser no longer consumes a header it cannot complete: it reads from a copy, so the O(n) reinsert and the 100 ms sleep inside the shared message thread are gone, and a peer that sits on an incomplete payload is disconnected after two minutes. The wire cap drops from 256 MB to MAX_SIZE. New net-message self-test covers complete, incomplete, stale and oversized headers.
Verified here: clean rebuild, all self-tests pass, lock order checked (no path takes cs_keyPool before cs_mapWallet), and a node built from this branch synced from genesis to the chain tip on the live network with zero rejections.
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does not cover (#104)
Follow-up to #102. Reserves derivation index 0 before deriving it, so a failure between installing the seed and writing the default key cannot leave the pool free to hand that index out as an ordinary key. Renames the address that stops being the default to 'Your Address (created before the recovery phrase)', which was otherwise left under the same name as the new one. Also documents why the key-pool clear precedes the seed write, correcting a review comment of mine that asked for the reverse.
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-newphrase installed a seed but left the wallet's visible address as the pre-seed random key and the old random pool intact, so the next address handed out -- a mining payout included -- could be one the twelve words cannot reproduce, while the window said a recovery phrase existed. Installing a phrase now clears the stale pool records (private keys stay in wallet.dat), reserves a derived default receiving key, tolerates already-stored derived keys so repeated installs do not stall the pool, and -restorephrase reports what it recovered rather than the wallet's total transaction count. Self-test covers installing a phrase over a pre-existing random pool.
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Adds -newphrase, -restorephrase, -restoredepth, -newaddress and -showderived, plus the window buttons that reach the same code. Restore derives forward in batches of 100 and rescans after each, stopping when a whole batch turns up nothing; the phrase is shown on the terminal only, never in debug.log. Proved end to end on a live wallet: paid a derived address, deleted wallet.dat, restored from the twelve words and recovered the coin. Coins on the pre-seed default address do not come back, and the command says so.
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Adds BIP32 derivation behind the wallet key pool, with no user-facing way to create a seed yet. wallet.dat gains hdmaster/hdchaincode/hdnext; the mnemonic is never stored. TopUpKeyPool derives m/n' when a seed exists and falls back to a random key, with a log line, if derivation fails. New -selftest=wallet-hd, wired into make tests on both platforms.
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On Windows the self-test from #91 printed nothing. printf in this tree is
OutputDebugStringF, which writes to the data directory debug.log, and the
Windows binary is linked -mwindows with no console. A failure was still caught,
since a non-zero return stops make, but it arrived with no way to tell which
check failed.
And because the first line printed before strSetDataDir pointed at the temporary
directory, every line was appended to the real debug.log -- the file users are
asked to paste into issues.
The file now gets the real printf, the data directory is set before anything
prints, and on Windows a console is borrowed only when stdout has nowhere to go.
That last condition matters: the first version reopened stdout unconditionally
and took the output away from `make tests > log`, which is the case that counts.
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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