1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/net.h b/src/net.h
index 440550c..0317676 100644
--- a/src/net.h
+++ b/src/net.h
@@ -146,6 +146,16 @@ static const int64        BTF_NO_PEER_HEIGHT_MAX_SECS = 20 * 60;
 // minutes is far beyond that, and well inside BTF_RECV_TIMEOUT_SECS.
 static const int64        BTF_MSG_WAIT_MAX_SECS = 2 * 60;
 
+// Largest payload a peer may announce in a message header: MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_SIZE
+// is defined further up this file. This tree reached the same cap by the same
+// reasoning as upstream #109 -- a 256 MB allowance is eight times what the
+// deserializer will accept (serialize.h throws above MAX_SIZE), so the header
+// check admitted an allocation the parser would only reject later, after
+// BTF_MSG_WAIT_MAX_SECS of a stalled peer slot -- so only the note survives.
+//
+// Both definitions were textually clean and 59 lines apart, so the replay onto
+// upstream merged them without a conflict and only the compiler objected.
+
 // Send a ping after this long with nothing to say, so a peer running the
 // inactivity check above does not mistake a quiet node for a dead one. Must
 // stay well under BTF_RECV_TIMEOUT_SECS.
@@ -741,6 +751,11 @@ public:
     {
         if (hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET)
         {
+            // Route through BtfCloseSocket so the accounting sees this close.
+            // A raw closesocket() here was invisible to sockcount, which is
+            // why the leak numbers never added up, and leaving the descriptor
+            // set afterwards is how a number that now belongs to somebody else
+            // gets closed a second time. (#103)
             BtfCloseSocket(hSocket);
             hSocket = INVALID_SOCKET;
         }