Bring main onto the line this project actually ships

main had drifted to a history with no ancestor in common with the tree we
build and deploy. It sat at be63e83 (2026-08-09) with 28 commits; the shipped
line, deploy/soak-2026-08-21, had 383. The two shared nothing -- git
merge-base returns no result at all -- so anyone cloning this repository
landed on a default branch that was neither current nor related to the
running node.

The 28 commits on main were audited before this merge: every one is already
present in the tree by content, including the two that are hardest to see
because they were rewritten afterwards -- the payout reorg-safety work
(PayoutBlockStillOnChain, since evolved to re-check on every retry rather
than once at maturity) and the nostr relay certificate verification
(SSL_set1_host, now with a Windows root-store path). Nothing on main is lost
by this merge.

Recorded as a merge rather than a force-push: main only ever moves forward,
its old history stays reachable as the first parent, and this is revertible.
The tree is taken wholesale from the merged branch, so main's content is now
exactly what was built and tested.

What this brings onto main:

- compactblock: BIP152-style compact block relay ported from upstream 1.2.23,
  primitives and unit test only, with the RAND_bytes failure path closed and
  the reconstruction allocation bounded.
- upstream/main 17741d9: isolated testnet parameters and genesis, optional
  2 MB large pages for RandomX. Mainnet genesis verified byte-identical
  through upstream's BuildGenesisBlock() refactor.
- deploy: every image built on bookworm so binaries run on Debian 12, and the
  container build now honours the RandomX and libsecp256k1 pins it had been
  silently ignoring since before 1.2.15.

Gates at this tree: 15/15 selftests, compactblock's 17 checks, consensus
constants unchanged against e4f898c apart from the pre-existing
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_GEN, mainnet genesis intact, money-log check ok.

1 files changed, 86 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/src/main.h b/src/main.h
index 27f89ac..26b3b69 100644
--- a/src/main.h
+++ b/src/main.h
@@ -33,6 +33,35 @@ static const unsigned int MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20000;
 // limit (32 MB), not a block rule. Bitcoin 0.1.0 predated the later 1 MB block
 // cap, so this tree inherited no real block-size consensus limit.
 static const unsigned int MAX_BLOCK_SIZE = 1000000;
+// How much of that cap a template we build may fill. Half, which is what both
+// assemblers already aimed at -- this only gives the number a name and one
+// place to live. They had already drifted on how it was enforced, which is the
+// bug this exists to stop repeating.
+//
+// NOT a consensus rule. CheckBlock() decides what the network accepts; this
+// decides what we are willing to produce, and it has to stay under that.
+static const unsigned int MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_GEN = MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / 2;
+
+// Room for one more transaction in a template that currently weighs
+// nBlockSize bytes and spends nBlockSigOps signature operations?
+//
+// Asked BEFORE the transaction is appended, never after. A template that has
+// already overshot is one CheckBlock() rejects, and asking afterwards only
+// measures the waste. Both assemblers call this, so neither can drift into a
+// different idea of what fits.
+//
+// Size gets a margin (half the cap); sigops do not. There is no cheap way to
+// spend the sigop budget usefully and no reason to reserve headroom in it, so
+// assembly holds itself to the same number CheckBlock() enforces -- and to the
+// same comparison. CheckBlock() fails on `> MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`, so a block
+// sitting exactly on the limit is valid and this has to accept it too.
+// Assembly and validation disagreeing by one is how the size bug started.
+inline bool BlockTemplateFits(unsigned int nBlockSize, unsigned int nBlockSigOps,
+                              unsigned int nTxSize, unsigned int nTxSigOps)
+{
+    return (nBlockSize + nTxSize <= MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_GEN &&
+            nBlockSigOps + nTxSigOps <= MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS);
+}
 static const int64 COIN = 100000000;
 // Total Bitflash emission: identical to Bitcoin (21 million).
 // MAX_MONEY guards against the value overflow bug (CVE-2010-5139), which in
@@ -65,6 +94,8 @@ extern map<uint256, CBlockIndex*> mapBlockIndex;
 extern uint256 hashGenesisBlock;
 extern uint256 hashGenesisMerkleRoot;
 extern unsigned int GENESIS_NONCE;
+void SelectGenesisParams(bool fTestNetIn);
+void SelectChainParams(bool fTestNetIn);
 extern CBlockIndex* pindexGenesisBlock;
 extern int nBestHeight;
 extern uint256 hashBestChain;
@@ -97,7 +128,11 @@ extern bool   fPoolMineBlind;       // /poolmineblind: mine on even when deaf to
 extern int    nHashThreads;       // participant: /hashthreads override (0 = cores-1)
 extern string strPoolName;        // operator: announced pool name
 extern string strPoolDashboardUrl; // operator: optional dashboard URL
+extern string strPoolStatusFile;   // operator: optional JSON status output path
+extern string strPoolRoundsFile;   // operator: optional public round proof path
 extern double dPoolFeePercent;     // operator: announced fee percent
+extern bool   fStratumBridge;      // participant helper: local Stratum bridge
+extern int    nStratumBridgePort;  // local bridge listen port, default 3333
 extern bool fSoloMineTest; // /solomine: mine without requiring a peer (local test)
 // Threads to hash with; 0 = decide from the hardware. Set by /genproclimit.
 extern int nMinerThreads;
@@ -226,9 +261,9 @@ static const unsigned int HD_BIP44_PURPOSE = 44;
 static const unsigned int HD_BIP44_ACCOUNT = 0;
 static const unsigned int HD_BIP44_CHAIN_RECEIVE = 0;
 static const unsigned int HD_BIP44_CHAIN_CHANGE = 1;
-// Provisional until Bitflash has an official SLIP-0044 assignment.
-// Proposed registry row: 4346950 | BITFLASH | Bitflash.
-static const unsigned int HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH_PROVISIONAL = 4346950;
+// Official SLIP-0044 assignment (registered 2026-08-07):
+// 4346950 | BITFLASH | Bitflash   (4346950 == 0x425446 == "BTF")
+static const unsigned int HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH = 4346950;
 extern int nHDKeySchema;
 extern unsigned int nHDReceiveNext;            // BIP44 external chain
 extern unsigned int nHDChangeNext;             // BIP44 internal chain
@@ -285,6 +320,7 @@ void LimitOrphanBlocks(unsigned int nMaxOrphans);
 // distinguishable, which the dedup filter would otherwise collapse into one.
 bool BitcoinMiner(int nThreadId = 1);
 void ThreadRPCServer(void* parg);  // rpc.cpp -- .btf pool server
+void ThreadStratumBridge(void* parg); // main.cpp -- local Stratum -> .btf bridge
 void GetParticipantMiningStats(uint64& sharesSent, uint64& sharesAccepted, double& hashRate);
 void SetParticipantMiningStatus(const std::string& status);
 std::string GetParticipantMiningStatus();
@@ -301,6 +337,7 @@ int64 GetBalance();
 struct WalletRecoveryAudit
 {
     bool fHaveSeed;
+    bool fSeedEncryptedLocked;
     bool fDeriveComplete;
     int nSchema;
     unsigned int nDerivedKnown;
@@ -320,12 +357,13 @@ struct WalletRecoveryAudit
     WalletRecoveryAudit()
     {
         fHaveSeed = false;
+        fSeedEncryptedLocked = false;
         fDeriveComplete = true;
         nSchema = HD_SCHEMA_NONE;
         nDerivedKnown = 0;
         nReceiveNext = 0;
         nChangeNext = 0;
-        nCoinType = HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH_PROVISIONAL;
+        nCoinType = HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH;
         nRecoverableTx = 0;
         nLegacyTx = 0;
         nRecoverableImmatureTx = 0;
@@ -337,9 +375,52 @@ struct WalletRecoveryAudit
     }
 };
 WalletRecoveryAudit GetWalletRecoveryAudit();
-bool CreateTransaction(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& txNew, int64& nFeeRequiredRet);
+
+// Why a send did not go through.
+//
+// The pool's payout thread has to decide, on every failed SendMoney, whether
+// the failure was the wallet's condition (wait for it to change) or a fault
+// (something is wrong with this payment). It used to guess by re-reading
+// GetBalance() afterwards and allowing a fixed CENT of headroom for the fee.
+// That cannot work: the fee here is a step function of the SERIALISED SIZE of
+// a transaction that no longer exists, and the step is from 0 to 11 * CENT at
+// 10,000 bytes -- so a one-CENT allowance is either unnecessary or an order of
+// magnitude short, never right. A pool wallet close to broke selects many
+// small inputs BECAUSE it is close to broke, which is what pushes the
+// transaction over 10 KB, so the guess is wrong exactly when the money is
+// tight.
+//
+// The wallet already knows the answer; it just did not say. SelectCoins()
+// failing is "there is not enough spendable coin to cover the amount plus
+// whatever fee this size of transaction requires", and it is the only reason
+// CreateTransaction() can fail that is about funding rather than about the
+// wallet being broken.
+enum WalletSendResult
+{
+    WALLET_SEND_OK = 0,
+    WALLET_SEND_INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS, // coin selection could not cover amount+fee
+    WALLET_SEND_FAILED              // anything else: could not build, sign or accept
+};
+
+// What the wallet did with a send request. nFeeRequired is the fee the
+// transaction turned out to need, which for a failed send is what coin
+// selection was asked for on top of the amount and could not find -- 0 if it
+// never got that far.
+struct SendMoneyOutcome
+{
+    WalletSendResult result       = WALLET_SEND_OK;
+    int64            nFeeRequired = 0;
+};
+
+bool CreateTransaction(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& txNew, int64& nFeeRequiredRet,
+                       WalletSendResult* presultRet=NULL);
 bool CommitTransactionSpent(const CWalletTx& wtxNew);
+// The three-argument form is kept, and kept as a distinct declaration rather
+// than a defaulted argument, because gui.cpp declares SendMoney itself instead
+// of including this header.
 bool SendMoney(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew);
+bool SendMoney(CScript scriptPubKey, int64 nValue, CWalletTx& wtxNew,
+               SendMoneyOutcome& outcomeRet);