# Tor mode

Bitflash can route outbound discovery traffic through a local Tor SOCKS5 proxy.
This is transport plumbing only: it does not change consensus, wallet keys,
mining, `.btf` addresses, or the encrypted rendezvous protocol.

## Client mode

Start Tor locally, then start Bitflash with:

```bash
bitflash -tor
```

`-tor` is shorthand for:

```bash
bitflash -socks=127.0.0.1:9050
```

If Tor listens somewhere else:

```bash
bitflash -tor=127.0.0.1:9150
bitflash -tor=[::1]:9050
```

For a SOCKS5 proxy that is not Tor, use `-socks` directly:

```bash
bitflash -socks=127.0.0.1:9050
bitflash -socks=[::1]:9050
```

If both `-tor` and `-socks` are present, Tor mode wins and the node prints a
warning. That keeps a command line with `-tor` from silently becoming a custom
proxy route.

## Managed Tor mode

`-managedtor` starts a Tor process for this node, writes a local `torrc`, creates
a v3 hidden service for the normal Bitflash P2P listener, routes outbound
discovery through that Tor instance, and signs the generated `.onion:8433`
endpoint into the node's `.btf` descriptor.

```bash
bitflash -managedtor
```

Without a value, Bitflash looks for Tor in this order:

1. `tor/tor.exe` or `tor/tor` beside the Bitflash binary;
2. `tor.exe` or `tor` beside the Bitflash binary;
3. `tor.exe` or `tor` on `PATH`.

Windows releases can also be built as `Bitflash-*-windows-with-tor.zip`. That
package includes the official Tor Expert Bundle under `tor/`, so the first path
above exists immediately after extraction and `bitflash -managedtor` needs no
separate Tor install.

The bundled-Tor package is created by:

```bash
make windows-tor
```

The packaging script verifies a pinned SHA256 for the downloaded Tor Expert
Bundle before copying it into the release directory. When `gpg` is available it
also verifies the matching `.asc` signature against the pinned Tor Browser
Developers signing-key fingerprint. Release builds should use
`TOR_VERIFY_GPG=required make windows-tor` to make that second check mandatory.
The Tor binary is bundled; the runtime data directory, hidden-service key, and
control cookie are still created under the user's Bitflash data directory.

To point at a specific Tor executable:

```bash
bitflash -managedtor=/opt/tor/bin/tor
bitflash -managedtor=C:\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\tor.exe
```

Managed Tor writes its state under the Bitflash data directory:

```text
managed-tor/
  torrc
  data/
  onion-service/
```

The private key for the onion address lives in `managed-tor/onion-service/`.
Back up that directory if you want the same onion address after moving the node.
Delete it only if you intentionally want a fresh onion endpoint.

`-managedtor` takes precedence over `-tor` and `-socks`, because it must choose
the local SOCKS port it starts. Diagnostics report the current managed Tor
state, including the SOCKS port and onion endpoint once Tor has generated it.

When Tor mode is enabled:

- outbound Nostr relay dials use Tor;
- outbound `.btf` rendezvous relay dials use Tor;
- outbound direct peer dials prefer signed `.onion` endpoints when a peer
  advertises one;
- destination names are sent to Tor as SOCKS5 domain-name CONNECT requests, so
  the local DNS resolver does not see them;
- direct `.onion` dials are refused unless a SOCKS5/Tor proxy is enabled;
- plain HTTP external-IP probes are skipped.

Tor mode affects outbound discovery and relay dials. It does not encrypt
`wallet.dat`, hide mining rewards on-chain, or change the `.btf` identity. A
relay still sees the TCP client that connected to it; with Tor mode that client
is the Tor exit or onion circuit endpoint instead of the user's direct IP.

## What to test

Use the public status page only as a rough health check. To prove the local node
is using Tor/SOCKS, test from the node machine:

```bash
bitflash -tor -debug
```

Then confirm in `debug.log` that Nostr and rendezvous dials report the proxy
path. A DNS leak test should show no local resolver lookup for relay hostnames:
the SOCKS5 request uses the domain-name form and asks the proxy to resolve it.

## Onion rendezvous relay

An operator can expose a Bitflash rendezvous relay as a Tor hidden service. The
node does not create hidden services itself; Tor owns that configuration.

Example `torrc`:

```text
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/bitflash-rendezvous/
HiddenServicePort 8434 127.0.0.1:8434
```

After restarting Tor, read the generated onion name:

```bash
sudo cat /var/lib/tor/bitflash-rendezvous/hostname
```

Then run the relay on localhost/VPS as usual and announce the onion endpoint from
nodes that use Tor:

```bash
bitflash -tor -rvrelay=exampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexample.onion:8434
bitflash -tor -announcerelay=exampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexample.onion:8434
```

For a pool operator that wants the pool descriptor to point at an onion
rendezvous relay, use both:

```bash
bitflash -operator -tor \
  -rvrelay=exampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexample.onion:8434 \
  -announcerelay=exampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexample.onion:8434
```

## Manual direct full-node hidden service

Managed Tor is the preferred path for ordinary nodes. Operators can still expose
the P2P listener through a separately managed Tor service:

```text
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/bitflash-node/
HiddenServicePort 8433 127.0.0.1:8433
```

After restarting Tor, read the generated onion name:

```bash
sudo cat /var/lib/tor/bitflash-node/hostname
```

Then start Bitflash with Tor outbound enabled and advertise that hidden service:

```bash
bitflash -tor \
  -onionservice=exampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexampleexample.onion:8433
```

That onion endpoint is signed into this node's self-certifying `.btf`
descriptor. New peers that resolve the descriptor and also run with `-tor` try
the `.onion:8433` P2P connection first. If it fails, they fall back to the
ordinary encrypted rendezvous path. Older nodes ignore the onion field and still
use the rendezvous relay because the descriptor keeps the legacy signature too.

If the node has `-onionservice` but has not registered at any rendezvous relay
yet, it can still publish an onion-capable descriptor with
`meeting_node = rendezvous-pending`. Tor-capable peers can dial the hidden
service directly from that descriptor. Rendezvous becomes a fallback, not a
precondition for being discoverable.

This means rendezvous relays stop being the only way to reach a node that has
published a hidden service. They remain useful bootstrap/fallback infrastructure,
but an already-discovered onion-capable peer can be reached directly over Tor.

Tor owns the private key under `HiddenServiceDir`; back it up if you want the
onion name to stay stable.

## Release smoke test

After building a Windows binary with managed Tor support, run the two-node smoke
test before cutting a release:

```powershell
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts\smoke-managed-tor-onion.ps1 `
  -Bitflash .\src\bitflash.exe `
  -Tor C:\path\to\tor.exe
```

The script creates two temporary datadirs, starts node A with `-managedtor`,
waits for it to publish its `.btf` identity and generated `.onion` endpoint,
then starts node B with its own `-managedtor`, `-oniononly`, and
`-connectbtf=<node-a>`. It passes only when node B logs that it connected to
node A `via direct onion`; rendezvous fallback cannot satisfy the test.

By default the script waits 120 seconds after node A's descriptor self-resolves
before it starts node B. Tor can create the local `hostname` before the hidden
service descriptor is visible enough for client circuits, and early dials often
fail with SOCKS5 reply `0x01`. Override this with `-OnionWarmupSec N` when
testing a slow or already-warmed Tor environment.

This test still uses Nostr for descriptor discovery, because that is how nodes
learn each other's signed `.btf` descriptors. It does not require a Bitflash
rendezvous relay to carry the P2P connection: once the descriptor includes the
signed onion endpoint, the actual node connection goes directly through Tor.