From 1db5f372c36eb701602a70a358de2344726ed734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bitflash Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 10:01:36 -0300 Subject: wallet encryption: the stack from #130–#133, with the two blockers fixed (#134) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit * wallet: refuse future encrypted wallet formats * wallet: add encrypted key unlock core * wallet: add encryptwallet rewrite command * wallet: read passphrases from stdin or files * wallet: keep the derivation across encryption, and take the logs with it Two things stopped the encryption stack from being safe to merge. Both were found against a wallet holding real coin, not in the self-tests. 1. Encrypting turned a BIP44 wallet into a legacy one. LoadWallet() ends by resetting the schema and the derivation counters when no seed is in memory. That was written when "no seed after loading" could only mean the wallet had none. An encrypted wallet has a seed -- it just has not been decrypted yet -- so the reset threw away metadata that had been read correctly a moment earlier. Unlocking later restores the seed and nothing restores the rest. Measured on the wallet from the #124 proof: after encrypting, index 1 moved off BAtgSgra2X8Dqo5PJzPCLJhPwrrC2thYVJ, the address actually holding 1.00 BTF, and the audit went from "1.00 covered by the phrase" to "0.00 covered, 1.00 wallet.dat-only". Encrypt your wallet and the program told you your recovery phrase no longer covered your money. Now the condition also accepts a wallet whose seed is present but encrypted. Same wallet, before and after: schema bip44, same four derived addresses, 1.00 BTF still reported as covered. 2. The plaintext keys stayed behind in the Berkeley DB logs. wallet.dat comes out clean -- verified by scanning the raw file for the 118 bytes of a known private key. database/log.0000000002 did not: it held the whole key, and still did after a full node restart, because every record this wallet ever wrote passed through the log. That defeats the feature for the case it exists for, since our own backup advice is to copy the whole directory rather than wallet.dat alone. log_archive() cannot fix it: it only drops logs Berkeley DB considers obsolete and never the one it is writing to, and with one 10 MB log per directory that is precisely where the keys are. They also did not get there at encryption time -- they accumulated over the wallet's whole life -- so nothing done during the rewrite can archive them out. So the encrypt command now closes the environment and deletes the logs on its way out, after the flush that makes every .dat self-contained. This is not secure erasure; the blocks are unlinked, not overwritten. It closes the case of someone reading a copied data directory. Getting there uncovered a third bug, older than both. DBFlush(true) is not safe to call twice. The first call closes the environment, and txn_checkpoint() on a closed environment segfaults instead of returning an error, so the try/catch around it never sees anything. EncryptWallet() already flushes before renaming the wallet, and the command flushes again on the way out -- that pair crashed every single time. Guarded now. The same function has been calling log_archive() with the address of an uninitialised pointer since 0.1.0, on every clean shutdown, in a path whose catch(...) cannot catch a structured fault on Windows. DB_ARCH_REMOVE requires that argument to be NULL. Fixed while here, because the encryption cleanup depends on that call not being a coin flip. --------- Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte --- src/main.cpp | 334 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 332 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index efece6c..0342650 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -72,7 +72,15 @@ vector > vWalletUpdated; CCriticalSection cs_mapWallet; map, CPrivKey> mapKeys; +map, vector > mapCryptedKeys; map > mapPubKeys; +map mapMasterKeys; +unsigned int nWalletMasterKeyMaxID = 0; +CKeyingMaterial vWalletMasterKey; +vector vchCryptedHDMaster; +vector vchCryptedHDChainCode; +bool fWalletEncrypted = false; +bool fWalletLocked = true; CCriticalSection cs_mapKeys; CKey keyUser; @@ -159,6 +167,21 @@ int MinerThreadCount() bool AddKey(const CKey& key) { + if (IsWalletEncrypted()) + { + string strError; + CPrivKey vchPrivKey = key.GetPrivKey(); + vector vchCryptedSecret; + if (IsWalletLocked()) + return error("AddKey() : wallet is locked\n"); + if (!EncryptSecret(vWalletMasterKey, vector(vchPrivKey.begin(), vchPrivKey.end()), + WalletKeyIV(key.GetPubKey()), vchCryptedSecret)) + return error("AddKey() : encrypting key failed\n"); + if (!AddCryptedKey(key.GetPubKey(), vchCryptedSecret)) + return false; + return CWalletDB().WriteCryptedKey(key.GetPubKey(), vchCryptedSecret); + } + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) { mapKeys[key.GetPubKey()] = key.GetPrivKey(); @@ -167,10 +190,287 @@ bool AddKey(const CKey& key) return CWalletDB().WriteKey(key.GetPubKey(), key.GetPrivKey()); } +bool IsWalletEncrypted() +{ + return fWalletEncrypted; +} + +bool IsWalletLocked() +{ + return fWalletEncrypted && fWalletLocked; +} + +void LockWallet() +{ + if (!fWalletEncrypted) + return; + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) + { + vWalletMasterKey.clear(); + if (!vchCryptedHDMaster.empty()) + vchHDMaster.clear(); + if (!vchCryptedHDChainCode.empty()) + vchHDChainCode.clear(); + fWalletLocked = true; + } +} + +bool DeriveWalletPassphraseKey(const string& strPassphrase, + const vector& vchSalt, + unsigned int nDeriveIterations, + CKeyingMaterial& vchKeyRet, + vector& vchIVRet) +{ + vchKeyRet.clear(); + vchIVRet.clear(); + if (vchSalt.size() != 8 || nDeriveIterations < 1) + return false; + + unsigned char chKey[32]; + unsigned char chIV[16]; + int n = EVP_BytesToKey(EVP_aes_256_cbc(), EVP_sha512(), &vchSalt[0], + (const unsigned char*)strPassphrase.data(), + (int)strPassphrase.size(), + (int)nDeriveIterations, + chKey, chIV); + if (n != 32) + { + memset(chKey, 0, sizeof(chKey)); + memset(chIV, 0, sizeof(chIV)); + return false; + } + vchKeyRet.assign(chKey, chKey + sizeof(chKey)); + vchIVRet.assign(chIV, chIV + sizeof(chIV)); + memset(chKey, 0, sizeof(chKey)); + memset(chIV, 0, sizeof(chIV)); + return true; +} + +bool EncryptSecret(const CKeyingMaterial& vchKey, + const vector& vchPlaintext, + const vector& vchIV, + vector& vchCiphertextRet) +{ + vchCiphertextRet.clear(); + if (vchKey.size() != 32 || vchIV.size() != 16) + return false; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) + return false; + + bool fOk = false; + int nLen = 0; + int nFinal = 0; + vector vchOut(vchPlaintext.size() + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_aes_256_cbc())); + if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, &vchKey[0], &vchIV[0]) && + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, &vchOut[0], &nLen, + vchPlaintext.empty() ? NULL : &vchPlaintext[0], + (int)vchPlaintext.size()) && + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &vchOut[0] + nLen, &nFinal)) + { + vchOut.resize(nLen + nFinal); + vchCiphertextRet.swap(vchOut); + fOk = true; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return fOk; +} + +bool DecryptSecret(const CKeyingMaterial& vchKey, + const vector& vchCiphertext, + const vector& vchIV, + vector& vchPlaintextRet) +{ + vchPlaintextRet.clear(); + if (vchKey.size() != 32 || vchIV.size() != 16 || vchCiphertext.empty()) + return false; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) + return false; + + bool fOk = false; + int nLen = 0; + int nFinal = 0; + vector vchOut(vchCiphertext.size()); + if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, &vchKey[0], &vchIV[0]) && + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, &vchOut[0], &nLen, &vchCiphertext[0], + (int)vchCiphertext.size()) && + EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, &vchOut[0] + nLen, &nFinal)) + { + vchOut.resize(nLen + nFinal); + vchPlaintextRet.swap(vchOut); + fOk = true; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return fOk; +} + +vector WalletKeyIV(const vector& vchPubKey) +{ + uint256 hash = Hash(vchPubKey.begin(), vchPubKey.end()); + vector vchIV(16); + memcpy(&vchIV[0], hash.begin(), vchIV.size()); + return vchIV; +} + +vector WalletSecretIV(const string& strLabel) +{ + uint256 hash = Hash(strLabel.begin(), strLabel.end()); + vector vchIV(16); + memcpy(&vchIV[0], hash.begin(), vchIV.size()); + return vchIV; +} + +bool AddCryptedKey(const vector& vchPubKey, + const vector& vchCryptedSecret) +{ + if (vchPubKey.empty() || vchCryptedSecret.empty()) + return false; + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) + { + fWalletEncrypted = true; + mapCryptedKeys[vchPubKey] = vchCryptedSecret; + mapPubKeys[Hash160(vchPubKey)] = vchPubKey; + } + return true; +} + +bool WalletCanSpendKey(const vector& vchPubKey) +{ + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) + return mapKeys.count(vchPubKey) > 0 || mapCryptedKeys.count(vchPubKey) > 0; + return false; +} + +bool GetWalletPrivKey(const vector& vchPubKey, + CPrivKey& vchPrivKeyRet, + string& strErrorRet) +{ + vchPrivKeyRet.clear(); + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) + { + map, CPrivKey>::iterator mi = mapKeys.find(vchPubKey); + if (mi != mapKeys.end()) + { + vchPrivKeyRet = (*mi).second; + return true; + } + + map, vector >::iterator mci = mapCryptedKeys.find(vchPubKey); + if (mci == mapCryptedKeys.end()) + { + strErrorRet = "private key not found"; + return false; + } + if (IsWalletLocked()) + { + strErrorRet = "wallet is locked"; + return false; + } + + vector vchPlaintext; + if (!DecryptSecret(vWalletMasterKey, (*mci).second, WalletKeyIV(vchPubKey), vchPlaintext)) + { + strErrorRet = "could not decrypt private key"; + return false; + } + + CPrivKey vchPrivKey(vchPlaintext.begin(), vchPlaintext.end()); + CKey key; + if (!key.SetPrivKey(vchPrivKey) || key.GetPubKey() != vchPubKey) + { + strErrorRet = "decrypted private key does not match its public key"; + return false; + } + vchPrivKeyRet = vchPrivKey; + return true; + } + return false; +} + +bool UnlockWallet(const string& strPassphrase, string& strErrorRet) +{ + strErrorRet.clear(); + if (!IsWalletEncrypted()) + return true; + + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) + { + for (map::iterator mi = mapMasterKeys.begin(); + mi != mapMasterKeys.end(); ++mi) + { + const CWalletMasterKey& kMasterKey = (*mi).second; + CKeyingMaterial vchPassKey; + vector vchPassIV; + if (!DeriveWalletPassphraseKey(strPassphrase, kMasterKey.vchSalt, + kMasterKey.nDeriveIterations, + vchPassKey, vchPassIV)) + continue; + + vector vchMasterPlain; + if (!DecryptSecret(vchPassKey, kMasterKey.vchCryptedKey, + vchPassIV, vchMasterPlain)) + continue; + if (vchMasterPlain.size() != 32) + continue; + + CKeyingMaterial vchCandidate(vchMasterPlain.begin(), vchMasterPlain.end()); + bool fValid = mapCryptedKeys.empty(); + for (map, vector >::iterator mci = mapCryptedKeys.begin(); + mci != mapCryptedKeys.end(); ++mci) + { + vector vchPlaintext; + if (!DecryptSecret(vchCandidate, (*mci).second, WalletKeyIV((*mci).first), vchPlaintext)) + break; + CPrivKey vchPrivKey(vchPlaintext.begin(), vchPlaintext.end()); + CKey key; + if (key.SetPrivKey(vchPrivKey) && key.GetPubKey() == (*mci).first) + fValid = true; + break; + } + if (fValid) + { + vWalletMasterKey = vchCandidate; + if (!vchCryptedHDMaster.empty()) + { + vector vchPlainHDMaster; + if (!DecryptSecret(vWalletMasterKey, vchCryptedHDMaster, + WalletSecretIV("hdmaster"), vchPlainHDMaster) || + vchPlainHDMaster.size() != 32) + { + strErrorRet = "could not decrypt HD master key"; + return false; + } + vchHDMaster = vchPlainHDMaster; + } + if (!vchCryptedHDChainCode.empty()) + { + vector vchPlainHDChainCode; + if (!DecryptSecret(vWalletMasterKey, vchCryptedHDChainCode, + WalletSecretIV("hdchaincode"), vchPlainHDChainCode) || + vchPlainHDChainCode.size() != 32) + { + strErrorRet = "could not decrypt HD chain code"; + return false; + } + vchHDChainCode = vchPlainHDChainCode; + } + fWalletLocked = false; + return true; + } + } + } + + strErrorRet = "passphrase did not unlock the wallet"; + return false; +} + static bool WalletAlreadyHasKey(const vector& vchPubKey) { CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_mapKeys) - return mapKeys.count(vchPubKey) > 0; + return mapKeys.count(vchPubKey) > 0 || mapCryptedKeys.count(vchPubKey) > 0; return false; } @@ -509,6 +809,12 @@ bool SetHDSeedFromMnemonic(const string& strMnemonic, string& strErrorRet) void TopUpKeyPool() { + if (IsWalletLocked()) + { + printf("TopUpKeyPool() : wallet is encrypted and locked\n"); + return; + } + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_keyPool) { while ((int)mapKeyPool.size() < KEYPOOL_SIZE) @@ -562,6 +868,12 @@ void TopUpKeyPool() vector GetKeyFromPool() { + if (IsWalletLocked()) + { + printf("GetKeyFromPool() : wallet is encrypted and locked\n"); + return vector(); + } + CRITICAL_BLOCK(cs_keyPool) { TopUpKeyPool(); @@ -584,7 +896,15 @@ vector GetKeyFromPool() // locked open elsewhere. Generating on demand is what this code did for // its whole life, so fall back to it rather than refuse to mine. printf("GetKeyFromPool() : pool empty, generating a key on demand\n"); - return GenerateNewKey(); + try + { + return GenerateNewKey(); + } + catch (const std::exception& e) + { + printf("GetKeyFromPool() : failed to generate a key: %s\n", e.what()); + return vector(); + } } @@ -3581,6 +3901,11 @@ bool BitcoinMiner(int nThreadId) // thread happened to win a block, which meant a backup taken while mining // could not spend what the very next block paid. vector vchPubKey = GetKeyFromPool(); + if (vchPubKey.empty()) + { + printf("BitcoinMiner: no wallet key available for coinbase; mining stopped\n"); + return false; + } CBigNum bnExtraNonce = 0; while (fGenerateBitcoins) { @@ -3759,6 +4084,11 @@ bool BitcoinMiner(int nThreadId) // them out one at a time under cs_keyPool, which is // what keeps concurrent coinbases distinct (#58). vchPubKey = GetKeyFromPool(); + if (vchPubKey.empty()) + { + printf("BitcoinMiner: no replacement wallet key available; mining stopped\n"); + fGenerateBitcoins = false; + } // Process this block the same as if we had received it from another node if (!ProcessBlock(NULL, pblock.release())) -- cgit v1.2.3