From b0ed2ce585d2a6fd7c6d8d4db7422734aedccb58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nsable-sh Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 11:58:03 -0300 Subject: site: document public deployment contract --- docs/tor.md | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) (limited to 'docs/tor.md') diff --git a/docs/tor.md b/docs/tor.md index 087c822..69b29f1 100644 --- a/docs/tor.md +++ b/docs/tor.md @@ -25,6 +25,17 @@ bitflash -tor=127.0.0.1:9150 bitflash -tor=[::1]:9050 ``` +For a SOCKS5 proxy that is not Tor, use `-socks` directly: + +```bash +bitflash -socks=127.0.0.1:9050 +bitflash -socks=[::1]:9050 +``` + +If both `-tor` and `-socks` are present, Tor mode wins and the node prints a +warning. That keeps a command line with `-tor` from silently becoming a custom +proxy route. + When Tor mode is enabled: - outbound Nostr relay dials use Tor; @@ -34,6 +45,24 @@ When Tor mode is enabled: - direct `.onion` dials are refused unless a SOCKS5/Tor proxy is enabled; - plain HTTP external-IP probes are skipped. +Tor mode affects outbound discovery and relay dials. It does not encrypt +`wallet.dat`, hide mining rewards on-chain, or change the `.btf` identity. A +relay still sees the TCP client that connected to it; with Tor mode that client +is the Tor exit or onion circuit endpoint instead of the user's direct IP. + +## What to test + +Use the public status page only as a rough health check. To prove the local node +is using Tor/SOCKS, test from the node machine: + +```bash +bitflash -tor -debug +``` + +Then confirm in `debug.log` that Nostr and rendezvous dials report the proxy +path. A DNS leak test should show no local resolver lookup for relay hostnames: +the SOCKS5 request uses the domain-name form and asks the proxy to resolve it. + ## Onion rendezvous relay An operator can expose a Bitflash rendezvous relay as a Tor hidden service. The -- cgit v1.2.3