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auto-managed-tor into main
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app icon)
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BITFLASH_NODE_BUILD)
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# Conflicts:
# src/makefile.mingw
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The legacy parser only accepted two decimal places (cents) and rejected
0.5, leaving six of the eight coin decimals unreachable by -sendto and the
send window. Parse up to 8 fractional digits Bitcoin-style, reject >8 to
avoid silent truncation. Adds the parse-money selftest (12 cases).
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The coin type 4346950 (0x425446 = BTF) was merged into the SLIP-0044
registry on 2026-08-07. Rename HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH_PROVISIONAL to
HD_BIP44_COIN_TYPE_BITFLASH and update comments, logs and UI strings.
Value is unchanged, so derivation paths and addresses are identical.
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The headless loop installed SIGINT/SIGTERM handlers only under #ifndef _WIN32,
so a headless node on Windows never reached the clean StopNode()+DBFlush() path:
Ctrl-C, closing the console window, a service stop and OS shutdown all killed it
mid-write, and a Berkeley DB wallet.dat left unflushed will not reopen.
Install a SetConsoleCtrlHandler that mirrors the POSIX path: set fShutdown and,
because the OS terminates us shortly after the handler returns on
CLOSE/LOGOFF/SHUTDOWN, block until the main loop signals the flush is done.
A 'taskkill /F' is still an uncatchable hard kill by design.
Closes #16.
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setint64() extracted big-endian bytes with a signed left shift (n <<= 8).
When the top byte is set that overflows int64 -- undefined behaviour, which
the script fuzzer flagged under UBSan (bignum.h:158). The result was correct
on two's-complement hardware, so this is a latent UB inherited from the
original 0.1 code, not a behaviour change. Do the shift on a uint64.
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* fuzz: add P2P message parser harness
* fuzz: avoid duplicate legacy header includes
* fuzz: seed the corpus with our network magic, not Bitcoin's
The two seed inputs began f5 be b6 d9, which is Bitcoin's message
start. Ours is bf 20 5c fd. CMessageHeader::IsValid rejects on that
field first, so both seeds died at the first check and the smoke run
exercised the reject path and nothing else.
libFuzzer would have to mutate its way onto four exact bytes before
reaching any parser, which does not happen in 128 runs. The job would
have gone green while covering none of what it was added to cover.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
Co-authored-by: Bitflash-sh <btf01@proton.me>
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Two bugs in RebuildJob(), the operator's Stratum template builder. It
is a separate path from BitcoinMiner() and had drifted from it.
A single pass over mapTransactions is not enough. That map is keyed by
hash and carries no dependency order, so a transaction spending another
still-unconfirmed transaction's output -- change from a recent send,
usually -- fails ConnectInputs whenever its parent sits later in map
order. One pass drops it, and map order does not change between
rebuilds, so every later rebuild drops it at the same point. That is
deterministic exclusion rather than bad luck: where pool operators mine
most blocks, a transaction of that shape can stay unconfirmed for as
long as its parent is. Now it retries until a pass adds nothing, which
is what the solo builder has always done.
And the fees reached nobody. nFees was declared inside the scan loop, so
each transaction reset it and the running total was discarded, while the
coinbase line passed a hardcoded 0. An operator collected fees into a
block and paid none of them out. The block stayed valid, since paying
less than allowed always is, so nothing ever complained.
Both the diagnosis and the fix are Vic-Nas's, from his fork of this
code. He deleted the fork, so this brings the work back rather than
letting it go with it. His description of the failure was precise enough
that finding the same two defects here took one read of our RebuildJob.
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Every fatal startup path wrote to stderr and to printf, and on Windows
neither reaches anybody. printf is remapped to OutputDebugStringF, so it
lands in debug.log inside the data directory. A -mwindows binary started
by double-clicking has no stderr at all, and AttachTerminal() cannot
help: it attaches to a parent console, which a double-clicked exe does
not have.
So Bitflash exited silently. Someone whose wallet.dat needs a newer
build -- exactly what the wallet format guard was added to tell them --
double-clicked and watched nothing happen. The guard was correct and
mute, which is the failure it was written to prevent.
Fatal startup errors now go through one reporter: debug.log as before,
stderr as before, and a message box when there is a person in front of
the screen. Applied to the three that mean "your data will not open":
the block index failing to load, the block index throwing, and
wallet.dat failing or throwing.
The box is deliberately not shown for a headless node. Those run under
scheduled tasks and services, where a modal dialog waits forever for a
click nobody is there to make -- a hung process instead of an exit code.
Headless keeps stderr and the log.
LoadWallet() now also reports why it refused, in a sentence, instead of
only logging it. The unsupported-format case is the one that has to be
understood by whoever reads it, and "LoadWallet failed" is not that.
Verified by breaking a throwaway wallet on purpose and starting both
ways. Headless: exit code 1, no dialog, no process left behind. Windowed
with no console: a box naming the file, the Berkeley DB error, the usual
cause, and where to look for more.
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(#134)
* wallet: refuse future encrypted wallet formats
* wallet: add encrypted key unlock core
* wallet: add encryptwallet rewrite command
* wallet: read passphrases from stdin or files
* wallet: keep the derivation across encryption, and take the logs with it
Two things stopped the encryption stack from being safe to merge. Both
were found against a wallet holding real coin, not in the self-tests.
1. Encrypting turned a BIP44 wallet into a legacy one.
LoadWallet() ends by resetting the schema and the derivation counters
when no seed is in memory. That was written when "no seed after loading"
could only mean the wallet had none. An encrypted wallet has a seed --
it just has not been decrypted yet -- so the reset threw away metadata
that had been read correctly a moment earlier. Unlocking later restores
the seed and nothing restores the rest.
Measured on the wallet from the #124 proof: after encrypting, index 1
moved off BAtgSgra2X8Dqo5PJzPCLJhPwrrC2thYVJ, the address actually
holding 1.00 BTF, and the audit went from "1.00 covered by the phrase"
to "0.00 covered, 1.00 wallet.dat-only". Encrypt your wallet and the
program told you your recovery phrase no longer covered your money.
Now the condition also accepts a wallet whose seed is present but
encrypted. Same wallet, before and after: schema bip44, same four
derived addresses, 1.00 BTF still reported as covered.
2. The plaintext keys stayed behind in the Berkeley DB logs.
wallet.dat comes out clean -- verified by scanning the raw file for the
118 bytes of a known private key. database/log.0000000002 did not: it
held the whole key, and still did after a full node restart, because
every record this wallet ever wrote passed through the log.
That defeats the feature for the case it exists for, since our own
backup advice is to copy the whole directory rather than wallet.dat
alone. log_archive() cannot fix it: it only drops logs Berkeley DB
considers obsolete and never the one it is writing to, and with one 10
MB log per directory that is precisely where the keys are. They also did
not get there at encryption time -- they accumulated over the wallet's
whole life -- so nothing done during the rewrite can archive them out.
So the encrypt command now closes the environment and deletes the logs
on its way out, after the flush that makes every .dat self-contained.
This is not secure erasure; the blocks are unlinked, not overwritten.
It closes the case of someone reading a copied data directory.
Getting there uncovered a third bug, older than both.
DBFlush(true) is not safe to call twice. The first call closes the
environment, and txn_checkpoint() on a closed environment segfaults
instead of returning an error, so the try/catch around it never sees
anything. EncryptWallet() already flushes before renaming the wallet,
and the command flushes again on the way out -- that pair crashed every
single time. Guarded now.
The same function has been calling log_archive() with the address of an
uninitialised pointer since 0.1.0, on every clean shutdown, in a path
whose catch(...) cannot catch a structured fault on Windows.
DB_ARCH_REMOVE requires that argument to be NULL. Fixed while here,
because the encryption cleanup depends on that call not being a coin
flip.
---------
Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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The right icon has been in the exe the whole time. GLFW never found it.
GLFW registers its own window class and fills hIcon with
LoadImageW(module, L"GLFW_ICON", ...), falling back to IDI_APPLICATION
when that exact resource name is missing. Ours was named "bitflash", so
the lookup failed and every window this program has opened wore the
generic Windows icon -- in the title bar and in the taskbar -- while the
correct artwork sat unused a few kilobytes away.
One line, verified by looking at it: rebuilt, ran the window, and zoomed
in on both places the user pointed at. The title bar and the taskbar
button now show the green BF coin. Checked the shell path too, since it
resolves icons differently: ExtractAssociatedIcon on the new exe still
returns the coin, so renaming the resource did not cost the file icon in
Explorer.
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* Add BIP32 path derivation foundation
* Add HD wallet schema metadata
* Add provisional BIP44 coin type metadata
* Activate BIP44 wallet derivation
* wallet: scan BIP44 restore depth per branch
* wallet: widen default BIP44 restore lookahead
---------
Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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CmdSendTo() has been in walletcmd.cpp since #115 and nothing declared
it or called it. The flag was dead: `bitflash -sendto=ADDRESS,AMOUNT`
started a node and said nothing, because an unrecognised argument is
not an error here.
The v1.2.14 notes announce it under "A headless node can finally
spend", and the headless Linux binary is exactly the one that does not
have it -- `-help` there lists /newaddress and stops. The published
Windows binary does have it, because it was built from a working tree
that carried these two files uncommitted. So the artifacts disagree
with each other and neither matches the tag.
This adds only what was missing: the declaration in walletcmd.h, the
dispatch in main(), and the -help line. No behaviour change to
CmdSendTo itself.
Checked on a build of this branch, against a throwaway data directory:
-help lists /sendto=ADDRESS,AMOUNT
-sendto=NOTANADDRESS,1 "Not a valid address", exit 1
-sendto=<valid>,-5 "Not a valid amount", exit 1
-sendto=<valid>,999 refused on an empty wallet, exit 1
All five self-tests still pass.
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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Creating a recovery phrase from the window aborted with an ImGui
assertion on the success path:
Expression: (g.DisabledStackSize > 0) && "Calling EndDisabled() too many times!"
File: imgui/imgui.cpp Line: 8435
The Finish button is wrapped in BeginDisabled/EndDisabled guarded by
!g_phraseWrittenDown, and its own click handler sets g_phraseWrittenDown
to false. So the pair was opened while the checkbox was ticked and
closed after the handler had unticked it: BeginDisabled was never
called, EndDisabled was, and ImGui asserted on the unmatched close.
It fires on the only path that installs a seed -- tick the box, press
Finish -- so every phrase created from the window has hit it since the
feature shipped in 1.2.12. Three releases carried it because nothing
tests the window.
Reproduced on the published 1.2.14 binary and confirmed fixed on this
build, driving the real window: Wallet Safety -> Create recovery phrase
-> tick -> Finish. The old build raises the assertion; the fixed build
closes the dialog, reports "This wallet has a recovery phrase", and the
address changes to a derived one.
The seed itself was already written before the assertion, so the wallet
was never left half-installed -- and ImGui's IM_ASSERT_USER_ERROR_RET
returns before touching its state, so answering Ignore was safe. Abort
was not: it kills the process with no DBFlush.
The restore dialog next door already does this correctly, copying the
condition into a local first. This makes the create dialog match.
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Restoring from a phrase gave up after the first batch of a hundred addresses that turned up nothing, and the wallet digs a wider gap than that by itself: a restore leaves nHDNext at the depth it scanned, the key pool derives KEYPOOL_SIZE more, and change takes the index after those. Measured on a real wallet with real coin -- restore, spend once, and the outputs land at indices 201 and 302; restoring again found only the first transaction and reported the spend as gone. With -restoredepth=500 the same wallet found both, which is what said this was reach and not loss.
Three quiet batches instead of one: 2 transaction(s) across 601 derived addresses on the same wallet, chain and phrase.
Worse after #109, not before it: change used to return to an input's key, a low index the scan had already passed. Making change recoverable moved it out to where the scan stopped looking.
Does not fix the gap growing with every restore -- pulling nHDNext back to the last used index is the structural answer and needs its own testing.
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#113 added three accept threads and called the extras harmless against an un-upgraded relay. They are not: an old relay closes the previous registration whenever the same node registers again, so the threads evict each other in a loop. Measured on the live network -- the node whose registrations landed on the un-upgraded New Jersey relay made 189 registrations in fifteen minutes with zero pairings, unreachable through it and hammering it, while the node on the upgraded relay made 9 with 7 pairings. One relay of three is upgraded, so this would hit two thirds of every node's registrations.
The relay half of #113 stays; it is compatible in both directions and is the prerequisite for raising this again, which the comment now states.
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A registration was consumed by the first caller and registering again replaced the previous one, so a node was reachable to one peer at a time and unreachable for the gap between being paired and registering again. Measured on a live node: descriptors resolved 53/54, our own registrations paired 11/12, nothing paired and went silent -- and half of every outbound dial failed, 15 of 30 in eleven minutes.
The relay keeps a queue per pubkey capped at four, pairs with the oldest still-alive registration and discards the dead; the node runs three accept threads, each holding its own registration. The wire protocol does not change, so either side can be deployed first.
Bench with both relays built from source and waves of concurrent dialers: old+1 65%, new+1 58%, old+3 68%, new+3 98%. Each half alone lands within noise of doing nothing.
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CheckBlock() validated block size against MAX_SIZE, the serializer's generic 32 MB guard rather than a block rule; MAX_BLOCK_SIZE did not exist in this tree at all, because Bitcoin's 1 MB cap arrived in 0.3.x, after the 0.1.0 this fork came from. A miner could produce a 32 MB block and every node would download, verify and store it.
Original work by mtg0001 in #110, rebased over #109 with the self-test conflict resolved, plus a comment explaining why the inherited count-against-bytes test stays.
Measured before choosing the number: 5709 blocks read from blk0001.dat give a largest block of 34,290 bytes and a median of 216, so 1 MB leaves 29x of headroom and rejects nothing that exists. A node built from this branch then synced genesis to 5706 on the live network with zero size-limit rejections and zero CheckBlock errors -- the same test that caught BIP30 rejecting a real block at height 859.
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Change from an HD wallet now goes to a newly derived phrase-backed key instead of reusing a spent input's key. Reusing an input key silently moved value back to a key the phrase cannot reproduce; if derivation fails the transaction is refused rather than creating unrecoverable change. Legacy wallets with no seed keep the 0.1.0 behaviour. Restore also scans past the pre-generated key-pool window before treating an empty batch as the end.
The message parser no longer consumes a header it cannot complete: it reads from a copy, so the O(n) reinsert and the 100 ms sleep inside the shared message thread are gone, and a peer that sits on an incomplete payload is disconnected after two minutes. The wire cap drops from 256 MB to MAX_SIZE. New net-message self-test covers complete, incomplete, stale and oversized headers.
Verified here: clean rebuild, all self-tests pass, lock order checked (no path takes cs_keyPool before cs_mapWallet), and a node built from this branch synced from genesis to the chain tip on the live network with zero rejections.
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The README still said deterministic restore was an open issue, told people the mining mode was not remembered between restarts, and wrote every flag in the slash form that MSYS2 turns into a path before the node sees it. Rewritten around the phrase and the file as two backups covering different keys, the -restorephrase note for anyone who made a phrase on 1.2.12, -rescan, the diagnostics report, and the two upgrade reasons measured this week.
Also: -help printed nothing at all. This tree remaps printf to OutputDebugStringF, so the usage page went into debug.log, and a -mwindows binary has no console to write to either way -- the one command whose job is to tell you something returned 0 and said nothing. It now takes the real printf and attaches the terminal. The help text was missing -restoredepth, -showderived and the wallet-hd self-test.
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does not cover (#104)
Follow-up to #102. Reserves derivation index 0 before deriving it, so a failure between installing the seed and writing the default key cannot leave the pool free to hand that index out as an ordinary key. Renames the address that stops being the default to 'Your Address (created before the recovery phrase)', which was otherwise left under the same name as the new one. Also documents why the key-pool clear precedes the seed write, correcting a review comment of mine that asked for the reverse.
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-newphrase installed a seed but left the wallet's visible address as the pre-seed random key and the old random pool intact, so the next address handed out -- a mining payout included -- could be one the twelve words cannot reproduce, while the window said a recovery phrase existed. Installing a phrase now clears the stale pool records (private keys stay in wallet.dat), reserves a derived default receiving key, tolerates already-stored derived keys so repeated installs do not stall the pool, and -restorephrase reports what it recovered rather than the wallet's total transaction count. Self-test covers installing a phrase over a pre-existing random pool.
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CNode::Disconnect() closed the socket and left the handle number in the object; ~CNode() then closed it again with a raw closesocket() the accounting never saw. There is no assignment of INVALID_SOCKET to CNode::hSocket anywhere in this tree, so the destructor's guard never fired. Between the two closes the OS can reissue that number, and the second close then takes down somebody else's connection. The same omission left a closed handle in the select() set, which fails every iteration and drives the recovery path that prints 'dropping node: its socket is no longer valid'. Measured A/B on the real network at matched socket volume: unpatched 552 sockets, 4 closes failing with 10038, 741 invalid-socket drops (all one peer), 11 peers held; patched 547 sockets, 0, 0, and 21 peers held. No protocol change.
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A live node reported one close failing with 10038 (WSAENOTSOCK) at the tunnel's pump end. It leaks nothing; what it says is that a site's bookkeeping and its sockets disagree about ownership -- and Windows reissues a handle number only after its last close, so a site whose bookkeeping outlives its socket will eventually close a number that belongs to a live connection. BtfSocketTag now counts a handle arriving while another site still claims it, which names the site to go and read.
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Windows lists a wildcard-bound socket twice in MSFT_NetTCPConnection, so counting Bound rows makes the number climb whenever the node talks to more peers -- 35 of a node's 38 Bound rows shared a local port with one of its own established connections. Counting orphans instead: a 1.2.10 node at 26h held 1262 and was still taking on 30-90 an hour; nodes on 1.2.11 and 1.2.12 held 3, transient. The leak was real and 1.2.11 ended it. Adds a live-unconn column (getpeername on every tagged socket, reports 1: the listener) and rewrites the notes that said otherwise.
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sockcount.h was in neither makefile's HEADERS, so editing it rebuilt only the objects whose .cpp had also changed and the rest kept the old struct layout -- one object indexing a shared function-local static by the old layout and another by the new one, in the same binary. compat.h and font_roboto.h were missing from one list each. Verified with a full clean rebuild: no duplicate-section warning.
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The 1.2.11 accounting answered 'which site' and stopped. On a node with 3h51m of uptime it reported 58 live sockets while Windows attributed 112 to the process, 47 of them bound and never connected, against 55 closes that had returned an error -- with nothing recording what those errors were. Close failures are now counted per code per site, and the table totals, so the live figure can be compared directly against what the OS attributes to the process. Instrumentation only.
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Adds -newphrase, -restorephrase, -restoredepth, -newaddress and -showderived, plus the window buttons that reach the same code. Restore derives forward in batches of 100 and rescans after each, stopping when a whole batch turns up nothing; the phrase is shown on the terminal only, never in debug.log. Proved end to end on a live wallet: paid a derived address, deleted wallet.dat, restored from the twelve words and recovered the coin. Coins on the pre-seed default address do not come back, and the command says so.
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Adds BIP32 derivation behind the wallet key pool, with no user-facing way to create a seed yet. wallet.dat gains hdmaster/hdchaincode/hdnext; the mnemonic is never stored. TopUpKeyPool derives m/n' when a seed exists and falls back to a random key, with a log line, if derivation fails. New -selftest=wallet-hd, wired into make tests on both platforms.
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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On Windows the self-test from #91 printed nothing. printf in this tree is
OutputDebugStringF, which writes to the data directory debug.log, and the
Windows binary is linked -mwindows with no console. A failure was still caught,
since a non-zero return stops make, but it arrived with no way to tell which
check failed.
And because the first line printed before strSetDataDir pointed at the temporary
directory, every line was appended to the real debug.log -- the file users are
asked to paste into issues.
The file now gets the real printf, the data directory is set before anything
prints, and on Windows a console is borrowed only when stdout has nowhere to go.
That last condition matters: the first version reopened stdout unconditionally
and took the output away from `make tests > log`, which is the case that counts.
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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A transaction only entered the wallet when its block arrived over the network,
so a key added afterwards was invisible: coins on the chain, private key in
wallet.dat, balance zero. /importwallet has always ended that way -- it writes
the keys and the money never shows up, which looks exactly like a failed import.
ScanForWalletTransactions walks the main chain and hands every transaction that
IsMine() to AddToWalletIfMine, the same two primitives the live path uses. Wired
into /importwallet, and offered as /rescan.
It is also the half that any recovery-phrase feature has to stand on: deriving
keys from twelve words is easy, and without this a restore restores nothing.
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Two follow-ups to #89. The default backup path was inside the data directory --
same disk, same folder the README says to copy wholesale, same folder the user
eventually deletes, which is the moment the backup was for. It now defaults to
the home directory and the dialog says so when a path under the data directory
is chosen anyway.
And nLastWalletBackup was written by the GUI, so anyone backing up with
/backupwallet -- the method the README documents first -- was told forever that
they had never backed up. BackupWallet records it now, so both paths count.
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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fGenerateBitcoins and nMineMode only mean anything together, and a wallet.dat
can hold one without the other: Bitcoin 0.1.0 already wrote fGenerateBitcoins
when mining was toggled, years before this fork had a mode. #84 restored that
lone flag, which puts the node in the one state the miner cannot act on --
generate on, mode relay -- so every miner thread starts and returns at the relay
guard. The machine looks like it is mining and hashes nothing.
That happened to a 32-core node on its first 1.2.11 start: "Mining with 31
thread(s)" followed by 31 lines of "BitcoinMiner thread N returned true".
The flag is now believed only when the mode it belongs to was stored with it,
and the pair is made coherent either way.
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A node was found holding 1502 sockets in Windows bound state, one ephemeral port
each, 9% of the machine range in nineteen hours. Reading the code did not find
it: every connect() failure path here closes its socket.
So count. Every socket is tagged at creation and untagged at close, across all
ten sites, with a counter for closes that fail. Already rules out three
explanations: nothing is created or closed behind the counter (untagged closes
are zero), no close is failing, and the leaked sockets are not in the live set --
tracked live matches what the OS reports as established, while the bound pile is
something the program already closed successfully.
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The wallet made a key per address and per block mined, so a backup only ever
contained the keys that existed the moment it was taken -- mine one block and
the coin lands on a key the backup has never heard of. The README warned about
it, which is an admission rather than a fix.
Keys are now generated a hundred at a time and handed out one at a time, each
written to wallet.dat before it can be pointed at. A backup covers the next
hundred addresses. Deterministic derivation (#47) stays open; this buys back the
distance between a backup and the next mistake.
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* Bump to 1.2.11
One change, and it is the reason a node on Windows kept collecting peers it
could not hear.
FD_SETSIZE was never defined in this tree, so it defaulted to 64 and select()
could watch the listen socket plus 63 peers -- everything past that stayed
connected and was never read again. Windows FD_SET stops adding once its array
is full and says nothing, so there was no error to notice. Because new
connections go on the end of vNodes, it was always the newest connection that
starved, including the ones dialed to fix connectivity.
Measured on two nodes: 277 and 90 CNode objects against 93 and 90 live
sockets, 316 and 355 sockets in a bound-but-never-connected state, and a status
bar reporting hundreds of peers for a node really talking to thirty.
1.2.11 raises FD_SETSIZE to 1024 on Windows, caps connections at 125, drops a
node stuck undeliverable after 60 seconds instead of holding it forever, stops
answering a failed select() with POSIX code that has no meaning on Windows, and
warns when there are more peers than select can watch.
* diag: let the node say what is wrong with it
Every hard problem in this project so far was found from outside the node --
sockets read over WMI, committed memory compared against a README, a grep over
somebody debug.log. In each case the node knew and had no way to say so.
One report, rendered identically for the GUI panel and the log: peers held vs
peers actually watched by select(), blocks received and how many arrived without
a parent, proof-of-work mode with the live miner thread count, and per peer the
age of the last message in each direction plus anything stuck unsent.
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Co-authored-by: Gilcimar Duarte <ti@gpm.infra>
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CreateTransaction kept the payee amount in nValue and then did
int64 nValueOut = nValue;
nValue += nFee;
with both lines inside the retry loop. The first pass is fine. When the fee
turns out to be too low the loop starts over, and on the second pass
nValueOut is read from an nValue that already carries the fee -- so the
recipient is sent the amount plus the fee, out of the sender's pocket, and
it compounds on every further retry.
Reachable, but it takes two things at once, which is why it has sat here:
the user must have set a transaction fee in Options (with the default of
zero, nValue += nFee adds nothing on the first pass and nothing is
corrupted), and the transaction must be big enough for GetMinFee to demand
more than that -- over 10 KB, so a wallet paying from many small inputs.
Keep nValue meaning what the payee asked for and carry nValue + nFee in a
separate nTotalValue, the way Bitcoin fixed it in 107d9e288.
Verified by building the same transaction on both versions, with a
synthetic wallet of 200 coins of 50, a configured fee of 0.05, and a
request of 5,000 that needs 101 inputs and 28 KB -- enough for GetMinFee to
demand 0.12 and force the retry:
before payee gets 5,000.05 change 49.83
after payee gets 5,000.00 change 49.88
Two other fixes from the same era were considered and left out. Satoshi's
CENT floor on the change output (496823249) exists to avoid a dust output
that his fee rules then penalised; this fee schedule has no such rule, so
adopting it would only donate sub-cent change to the miner. The
1-confirmation rule (a790fa46f) is a spending-policy change, not a bug fix,
and deserves its own decision.
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Three functions open a cursor and none of them close it: CTxDB::LoadBlockIndex,
CTxDB::ReadOwnerTxes and CWalletDB::LoadWallet.
Berkeley DB requires every cursor to be closed before the handle it came
from. ~CDB() calls Close(), which calls pdb->close() inside a catch-all
that swallows whatever it returns -- so the violation was real and silent,
which is this codebase's favourite kind.
An open cursor also holds read locks, and that is not theoretical here: the
first version of the startup chain repair (#61) opened a write transaction
beside the cursor LoadBlockIndex was still holding and waited on it
forever, coming up, printing its diagnosis and hanging with nothing in any
log. The repair had to be moved to the caller to get clear of it.
A scope guard rather than a close call at each return, because all three
functions have several exits and the point is to stop relying on anyone
remembering. Same fix Bitcoin made in c5c7911da.
Verified: node starts, verifies 288 blocks, loads the wallet, runs the
spent-flag rescan and syncs the live chain to 4422 with no Berkeley DB
error anywhere and db.log still empty.
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Three independent bounds on what an untrusted peer can make this node allocate:
- serialize.h: reject a compact size above MAX_SIZE before reading a string or a
vector, instead of discovering it read by read. MAX_SIZE moves from main.h to
serialize.h, where the checks live; headers_core.h includes serialize.h first,
so every existing user still sees it.
- main.cpp: cap an orphan transaction at 10,000 inputs. Orphans are stored and
never validated, so mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev grew with one entry per input
of every orphan a peer cared to send.
- rpc.cpp: drop a Stratum line nested deeper than 20 before json::parse recurses
into it. The scan tracks string state, so a worker name containing { or [ is
no longer mistaken for nesting.
Verified: builds clean on UCRT64; the depth scanner passes a table of legitimate
Stratum lines and nesting attacks; a node built from this branch synced the chain
from genesis to 4462 with no deserialization failure and no rejected block.
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Two defects that feed each other. Measured on a 32-core production node:
1287 of 4117 processed blocks arrived with a missing parent, 97 arrived
that the node already had, and 490 transactions arrived whose inputs were
unknown.
mapOrphanBlocks had no ceiling at all. Orphan transactions have had one
since 0.1.0 -- MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS with LimitOrphanTx -- and blocks
never did. An orphan block whose parent never turns up stays in memory for
the life of the process, each one holding a whole block, and a peer can
send an unlimited number of them just by inventing the previous-block hash.
LimitOrphanBlocks mirrors the transaction one: random eviction, both maps
kept in step, and the CBlock deleted because mapOrphanBlocks owns it.
Every orphan block also fired a getblocks at the sender, and an inv for a
block already held as an orphan fired another, with no filtering. So a node
missing part of the chain asked the same peer the same question over and
over, and the duplicate answers made more orphans, which asked again.
CNode::PushGetBlocks remembers the last request and drops a repeat -- the
same fix Bitcoin made in e2c2648c1.
One trap found by testing rather than by reading: eviction picks at random
and may pick the block just inserted, so GetOrphanRoot has to be read out
of pblock before LimitOrphanBlocks runs, not after. The first version had
that backwards and would have read freed memory.
Verified with fabricated orphans, four of the seven sharing one
hashPrevBlock so the multimap path is exercised: 7 in, limit(3) leaves 3,
limit(0) leaves 0, both maps in step at every stage, no crash. Then a run
against the live network to 4348 with no scaffolding left behind.
The storm itself was not reproducible on demand -- the network is healthy
today and produced one orphan block in seven minutes -- so there is no
before/after on the metric that motivated this.
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